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ABSTRACT
Aims Tobacco tax increases are the most effective means of reducing tobacco use and inequalities in smoking, but
effectiveness depends on transnational tobacco company (TTC) pricing strategies, specifically whether TTCs overshift
tax increases (increase prices on top of the tax increase) or undershift the taxes (absorb the tax increases so they are
not passed onto consumers), about which little is known. Design Review of literature on brand segmentation.
Analysis of 1999–2009 data to explore the extent to which tax increases are shifted to consumers, if this differs
by brand segment and whether cigarette price indices accurately reflect cigarette prices. Setting UK. Participants
UK smokers. Measurements Real cigarette prices, volumes and net-of-tax- revenue by price segment. Findings
TTCs categorise brands into four price segments: premium, economy, mid and ‘ultra-low price’ (ULP). TTCs have sold
ULP brands since 2006; since then, their real price has remained virtually static and market share doubled. The price
gap between premium and ULP brands is increasing because the industry differentially shifts tax increases between
brand segments; while, on average, taxes are overshifted, taxes on ULP brands are not always fully passed onto
consumers (being absorbed at the point each year when tobacco taxes increase). Price indices reflect the price of
premium brands only and fail to detect these problems. Conclusions Industry-initiated cigarette price changes in the
UK appear timed to accentuate the price gap between premium and ULP brands. Increasing the prices of more
expensive cigarettes on top of tobacco tax increases should benefit public health, but the growing price gap enables
smokers to downtrade to cheaper tobacco products and may explain smoking-related inequalities. Governments must
monitor cigarette prices by price segment and consider industry pricing strategies in setting tobacco tax policies.
Keywords Cigarette prices, cigarette taxation, tobacco industry, tobacco industry pricing strategy, tobacco
tax policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Raising tobacco taxes and prices is one of the most effec-
tive means of reducing tobacco use, particularly in
the young and the less well-off—who are known to be the
most price sensitive [1–6]. Price increases are also the
most likely intervention to reduce inequalities in smoking
[7,8]. However, the effectiveness of tobacco tax policies
depends on tobacco company pricing strategies. Tobacco
companies can choose to absorb the tax increase so that it
is not passed onto to consumers as an increase in price,
thus undermining the effect of tobacco tax policy (a prac-
tice known as undershifting); to pass it onto consumers in
full; or to increase prices on top of the tax increases (a
practice known as overshifting and which increases both
the effect of the tax increase and industry revenue). Yet,
surprising little is known about tobacco industry pricing
strategies [6] and no studies have yet addressed this issue
in the UK [6].
This article therefore aims to examine tobacco indus-
try pricing strategy in the UK. Specifically, it aims to
identify how the tobacco industry segments its ciga-
rettes by price, and then to examine how price, volume
and revenue trends vary by price segment, the extent to
which tobacco tax increases are shifted to consumers,
whether this differs by price segment and whether
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commonly used price indices adequately measure ciga-
rette price trends.
Background: tax policy and structure
The parameters within which UK tobacco tax policy is set
are determined by European Union (EU) legislation
requiring member states to have a mixed tobacco excise
structure with both proportional (ad valorem) and fixed
(specific) elements. Until January 2011 excise taxes were
based on the retail selling price of the price category most
in demand, commonly known as the most popular price
category (MPPC). Directive 2010/12/EU [9], which
entered into effect on 1 January 2011, changes the refer-
ence point for calculating taxes from the MPPC to the
weighted average retail selling price.
METHODS
Literature review: price segmentation
The study was approved by the University of Bath
Research Ethics Approval Committee for Health. A com-
prehensive reviewof the literatureonbrandsegmentation
and cigarette prices covering the period1999 to2009was
used to inform the allocation of brands to price segments.
The review, which included the academic literature,
market reports (Euromonitor, KeyNote and Mintel),
industry analyst reports, tobacco manufacturer annual
reports, and tobacco industry and retail journals (Tobacco
Journal International; Retail Newsagent, The Grocer, ProW-
holesaler and Talking Retail) recorded carefully (i) the
number of price segments identified and (ii) the names of
each brand identified in a particular price segment at any
point in time. More than 80 relevant articles or reports
were identified, with only one coming from the academic
literature [10]. Full details are available elsewhere [11].
This reviewshowed thatmost sources reported threeor
four price segments. In recent years, four segments have
more consistently been reported. This is because, from
approximately 2005, a new ‘ultra-low price’ (ULP)
segment, which had not featured consistently before,
began to be reported in the industry and retail literature
[12–17] as the transnational tobacco companies (TTCs)
began to acquire these brands from supermarkets, which
had sold them for a number of years [10], and to launch
their own ULP brands. For example, in January 2006
ImperialTobacco acquired theWindsor Blue brandwhich
hadbeen sold by theCooperative supermarket for30years
[15,18] and in November 2008 launched brand-variants
John Player Special (JPS) Silver, Blue and Menthol as a
cut-price versions of its longstanding JPS brand [19].
On the basis of this literature review, cigarette brands
were categorised into four price segments—premium,
mid-price, economy and ULP. As TTCs only acquired or
launched ULP brands from themid-2000s onwards, price
data for this segment were only available from 2006.
Data
Price data
Brand-specific cigarette price data from 1999 to 2009
were obtained for packs of 20 cigarettes (or 19 cigarettes
for brands sold only in 19s). No single source covering the
same geographical area was available for the whole
period.Themain source of price data until October 2005,
when it ceased publication, was PriceChecker, a supple-
ment to the Retail Newsagent magazine from which data
were extracted by hand. This gave recommended retail
prices (RRP) for all major cigarette brands for the UK
market (i.e. Great Britain and Northern Ireland wherein
Northern Ireland accounts for just 3% of total volume
[20]). From November 2006 Nielsen started to publish
cigarette sales data, including volume and price, for the
Great Britain market (i.e. excluding Northern Ireland)
and obtained, via scan, data inputs covering 87% of total
sales [21].
Comparisons between these two datasets, supermar-
ket retail prices and manufacturers’ RRPs showed that
manufacturers’ RRP and Nielsen data were almost iden-
tical, indicating that our two data sources (PriceChecker
and Nielsen) could be relied on to provide comparable
price data over time. The expense of Nielsen data pre-
cluded our ability to collate monthly data. Data were
therefore obtained for May/June and November/
December each year (other than in 2005 when October
data were used in place of November/December as
October was the last published edition of PriceChecker).
Volume market share data
Data on market share by volume were obtained from two
sources: Nielsen from November 2006 until November
2009 as detailed above [22] and the General Household
Survey (GHS), now known as the General Lifestyle Survey
[23], for the period 2001 to 2008 (2008 being the most
recent survey available at the time this work was under-
taken). The GHS is an annual survey designed to be rep-
resentative of the population of the UK. Each year, one
question, posed only to smokers of manufactured ciga-
rettes aged 16 years plus, asks which brand of cigarettes
they smoke. This question, combined with the number
of sticks smoked per week by each smoker, was used to
calculate market share by brand and price segment.
Analysis
Trends in cigarette prices, volumes and revenue by
price segment
Weighted average prices for a pack of 20 cigarettes were
calculated for the period 2001 to 2009 by price segment
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using GHSmarket share data for the period 2001 to 2005
and Nielsen market share data from 2006 to 2009. Real
prices were then calculated using both the Retail Price
Index (RPI; the UK government’s preferred measure of
inflation during this period) and Consumer Price Index
(CPI; the new UK government’s preferred measure of
inflation from 2010); both obtained from the Office
for National Statistics (ONS; http://www.statistics.gov.
uk/statbase/tsdtables1.asp?vlnk=mm23). Examination
of both real data series showed few differences and for
simplicity we present just the CPI adjustment. Trends in
the volume of cigarette sales by price segment were cal-
culated using GHS (2001–08) and Nielsen (2006–09)
data, with the 3-year overlap period from 2006 to 2008
used to ensure comparability.
The tax paid per pack of cigarettes was calculated
based on the weighted average retail selling price within
each price segment. Average net-of-tax revenue per pack
of cigarettes for each price segment was then calculated
by subtracting the tax [excise plus value added tax (VAT)]
paid from the weighted average price. Results are pre-
sented graphically in real terms using the UK CPI.
Exploring industry pricing strategy
To explore the extent to which tobacco companies shift
tobacco tax increases onto smokers changes in price net of
tax (deflated using CPI with 2010 as the baseline year)
were examined between November 2006 and 2009 by
price segment. The price trends by segment were first
examined for each of the 3 years. Then, each year was
broken into two periods in order to compare average price
trends in the periods when duty increases (November–
May; duty increases occurring in March or April each
year) with the period when duties do not increase (May–
November).
Scatterplot graphs were used to explore the relation-
ship between price and market share. The first—a plot of
the increase in real prices between 2006 and 2009
against market share in November 2006 for each
brand—tested the hypothesis that brands with higher
market shares would have larger increases in price. The
second—a plot of change in market share over the period
2006–09 against changes in real price—explored
whether cheaper brands had larger increases in market
share.
Comparison of price indices
The two most commonly used price indices for cigarettes
during the study period, the MPPC and the RPI for ciga-
rettes, were compared with weighted average prices over
the period 2001–09.
RESULTS
Trends in cigarette prices, volumes and revenue by
price segment
While the real weighted average price of premium, mid-
price and economy brands has increased gradually
between 2001 and 2009 (Fig. 1), the real price of ULP
cigarettes has barely changed. Consequently, the real
price gap between these segments has widened.
Volume data comparisons show that the two data
sources (GHS and Nielson) are consistent and provide a
reasonable assessment of volume trends over time
(Fig. 2). The market share held by ULP cigarettes has
increased markedly in recent years, doubling between
2006 and 2009 alone. The largest market share, around
50% of the market, is still held by the economy segment,
although this has fallen recently owing to gains in the
ULP segment. The market share of both premium and
mid-price brands has fallen from 2001 onwards,
although mid-price brands are far fewer in number and
have never been a major part of the market.
Consistent with the price data, there is a wide and
increasing gap in revenue between premium and ULP
brands (Fig. 3). Revenue from premium and mid-price
brands has increased in real terms, while revenue from
ULP brands has not and the gap in average revenue
between these segments now stands at about £1.00. An
interesting pattern occurs with economy brands; their
revenue is virtually static between 2001 and 2005 but,
once ULP brands emerge, revenue in the economy
segment starts to increase (Fig. 3).
Industry pricing strategy
Across the market as a whole, the industry is increasing
prices over and beyond tax increases (i.e. overshifting
taxes) (Table 1). However, the extent to which tax
increases are shifted to smokers varies both over time and
by brand segment. Taxes were overshifted in each of the 3
years examined and in all brand segments other than the
ULP segment in 2007–08 when taxes were absorbed.
Across the 3-year period as awhole, average prices of ULP
brands increased by just 1.3 pence compared with
between 4.1 and 4.9 pence on more expensive brands. If
this 3-year analysis is limited to brands with a market
share over 0.2% (data not shown), price falls of -1.2
pence are seen on ULP brands (owing to taxes being
absorbed) and price increases of between 4.0 and 5.0
pence in the other segments. The time period in which
industry-initiated price changes occur also varies by
brand segment. For premium and mid-price segments,
price increases during the November–May period (when
taxes rise) are greater than for theMay–November period.
For the economy segment the price increases are more
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evenly balanced between the two halves of the year. For
the ULP segment the pattern is quite different. Net prices
fall by 3.00 pence during theNovember toMay period (i.e.
taxes are undershifted at this point), but increase in the
second half of the year.
There is little relationship between market share and
price increases overall or within each price segment and
thus little evidence to support the hypothesis that price
increases are greater for brandswith largermarket shares
(Fig. 4a). Consistent with the data in Table 1, brands in
the ULP segment have much smaller real price increases
than brands in other segments—less than a 1% increase
for every brand in this group, with the majority showing
no change or falls in real price (some as high as -5%). The
real price increases for premium brands are lower (mostly
between 3%and 5%) than formedium-priced or economy
brands (mostly between 5% and 6%).
Overall (and with the exception of a few outliers),
change in market share was inversely related to changes
in price (Fig. 4b) and ULP brands had both the largest
declines in price and the greatest increase in market
share.
£3.00
£3.50
£4.00
£4.50
£5.00
£5.50
£6.00
£6.50
£7.00
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
R
ea
l W
ei
gh
te
d 
A
ve
ra
ge
 P
ric
e
Premium Middle Economy Ultra Low MPPC
Figure 1 Real weighted average cigarette prices by price segment (2001–2 to 2009–10) using Consumer Price Index (CPI) indexation
Source: PriceChecker and General Household Survey (for 2001–05), Nielsen (for 2006–09).
CPI data used are Office for National Statistics’ (ONS)’ ‘all items’ CPI (designation: D7BT).
The most popular price category (MPPC) data are published by the Tobacco Manufacturer’s Association (TMA) (http://www.the-tma.org.uk/
tma-publications-research/facts-figures/uk-cigarette-prices/).
The weighted average price measure is based on our own calculations.
Note: CPI and weighted average price data are taken from November each year, while the MPPC data are taken form January of the following
year. Hence, the year categories have been labelled ‘2001–02’, ‘2002–03’, etc. in this graph.
Figure 2 Volume market share by price
segment, 2001–09
Source: General Household Survey (GHS)
and Nielsen data.
G =GHS data; Ni =Nielsen data; ULP =
ultra-low price. ‘Others-G’ =market share
held by brands that were not identified in
the GHS (this includes ‘brand not found’, i.e.
the smoker names the brand, but it is not
identified in the GHS list;‘smokes two brands
equally’ or ‘no regular brand’—for the last
two categories the survey does not attempt
to record a brand) or that were identified in
the GHS, but for which we were unable to
identify price data and thus to allocate to a
price segment; the brands in this second
group all had very low market shares.
Further details are provided elsewhere [11].
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Comparison of price indices
The government’s RPI measure for cigarettes and the
MPPC measure give an exaggerated picture of cigarette
price increases (Fig. 5). From 2001–02 to 2009–10,
weighted average cigarette prices increased by around
28% compared with 41% for MPPC and 38% for
RPI. The MPPC measure tracked the cigarettes’ RPI
closely up to 2006–07 and the minor subsequent differ-
ences are likely being explained by changes to the VAT
regime from 2008 onwards differentially impacting
the MPPC and RPI data (for full explanation see Fig. 5
footnote).
A comparison of both RPI and MPPC with segment
specific prices indicates that both measures almost
exactly reflect the price of premium brands and do not,
therefore, reflect the growth in volume and smaller price
increases of the cheaper price segments (Fig. 1 shows this
comparison for MPPC).
DISCUSSION
Key findings
Using an extensive literature review and analysis of
survey and commercial data we provide, to our knowl-
edge, the most in-depth analysis of tobacco industry
pricing strategies yet undertaken. We show that the
industry categorises its brands into four price segments
from premium to ULP, the latter sold by TTCs only
since 2006 whence the number of ULP brands has
increased and their market share doubled. The price and
revenue gap between the most and least expensive
brands has increased since 2001, this gap becoming
more marked since ULP brands were introduced in
2006, as their real price has remained virtually static.
Our examination of the industry’s pricing strategy
indicates that this growing gap in price (and revenue)
can be explained by the extent to which the industry
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Figure 3 Real (net-of-tax) revenue per
pack of cigarettes by price segment, using
Consumer Price Index (CPI) indexation,
2001–09
Source: Our calculations using cigarette
price data from PriceChecker (2001–05)
and Nielsen (2006–09), and data on
tobacco duty rates [59].
CPI data used are Office for National Sta-
tistics’ (ONS)’ ‘all items’ CPI (designation:
D7BT).
Table 1 Real price increases (net of tax) by brand segment each year and for the periods November–May, May–November and
November–November for the 3 years combined (2006–09).
Real price increases (net of tax)
in pence each year
Average real price increase (net of tax) in pence per pack
of cigarettes over the 3-year period 2006–9
Price segment
2006–
07
2007–
08
2008–
09
November–
Maya
May–
November
November–
November
Premium 4.6 2.2 5.7 2.9 1.2 4.1
Mid 5.0 2.7 6.2 3.9 0.7 4.6
Economy 3.5 5.8 5.5 2.1 2.8 4.9
Ultra-low 4.8 -3.6 2.8 -3.0 4.3 1.3
Weighted average, all brands 3.5 1.1 1.3 0.9 1.1 2.0
Source: Nielsen data (http://www.nielsen.com/uk/en.html). Real price data adjusted using Consumer Price Index with 2010 as baseline. aThe half of
the year in which the tobacco excise increase occurs.
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differentially overshifts taxes between price segments.
Between 2006 and 2009, while the industry overshifted
taxes by an average of more than 4.00 pence per
annum on all other brand segments, it did so by an
average of only 1.3 pence on ULP brands. Moreover, at
the point when tobacco taxes are increased in March/
April each year, the industry overshifts the tax increase
on the more expensive brands, while absorbing the tax
increase on ULP brands. This suggests that industry-
initiated price changes are timed to reassure price-
sensitive smokers and accentuate the price gap, but also
to hide the price increases on the more expensive brands
behind the excise increases.
When examining trends in the real prices of indi-
vidual ULP brands, we find that some have fallen by as
much as 5% and none have increased by more than 1%,
while price increases in other brands vary from over 2%
to approximately 6%. Unsurprisingly, we find that
changes in market share are related to price changes
and thus the largest increases in market share are seen
in ULP brands.
Although the overshifting of taxes should benefit
public health, the opportunities and incentives for con-
sumers to downtrade from expensive to cheaper ciga-
rettes have clearly increased over time and, if current
pricing strategy continues, will increase further. Recent
research showing that the availability of low cost ciga-
rettes in a market reduces the effect of cigarette price
increases in promoting smoking cessation [24] suggests
this pricing strategy may undermine the public health
impact of tax increases.
Our findings also indicate that the way in which
tobacco prices have been tracked, and thus the effect of
tobacco tax policies monitored (using cigarettes’ RPI or
MPPC), has been inadequate. Because both measures
simply reflect the price of premium brands, they give an
Figure 4 Relationship between price and
market share. (a) Change in real price
between 2006 and 2009 as a function
of market share in 2006 (source: Nielsen
data, http://www.nielsen.com/uk/en.html).
(b) Change in market share between 2006
and 2009 as a function of change price
between 2006 and 2009 (source: Nielsen
data). ULP = ultra-low price.
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exaggerated picture of cigarette price increases. This
helps explain why the problems revealed in this article
have not been identified previously and highlights the
need for greater scrutiny of tobacco prices, including
trends in the four price segments, than has hitherto been
the norm.
The TTCs’ own documents released via litigation
provide insights into why the industry keeps some ciga-
rettes so cheap and who they target with such brands.
Existing document research indicates that low-priced
brands and price promotions are developed to target
young smokers [25], based on the industry’s awareness of
evidence of the higher price sensitivity of this group and
the particular effect of price on the decision to smoke
[26,27]. Other documents indicate that cheap products,
including cigarettes [28] and roll-your-own, have a ‘a
tactical role in keeping smokers in the market place when
cigarette prices rise’ [28,29]—the anticipation being
that such smokers will, at some stage, trade-up to more
expensive products [30]. Such motives are consistent
with the identified purposes of cigarette marketing,
which include attracting starters, keeping smokers in the
market, restarting quitters and boosting consumption
[31].TTC documentswould thus suggest that ULP brands
may perform two functions: keeping price-sensitive
smokers in the market and enabling the price-sensitive
young to take up smoking.
Strengths, weaknesses and related evidence
The main weakness of the analyses presented here is
that they rely on different data sources over time. This
was, however, unavoidable and extensive efforts were
made to validate and check consistency of the data over
time [11].
The main strength of this work is that it is the first
time such price data have been examined in detail in
Europe. As such, thework addresses amajor research gap
identified in a recent review [6]. Despite the work’s
novelty, the findings are consistent with observations in
financial analyst and market reports of industry pricing
power and the greater profitability of high-end brands
[32–35], with empirical evidence of the overshifting of
taxes in the USA and other concentrated markets in
recent years [6,36–40], and of the importance of price in
determining the market share of discount brands in the
USA [41]. Although one study covering 12 EU countries
found undershifting of taxes in the early 1990s [42],
there has since been considerable market consolidation
in Europe [34,43].
Implications for policy and practice
Given the importance of price as a tobacco control policy
both in encouraging quitting and discouraging uptake,
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Figure 5 Growth in cigarette price indices, 2001–09 (2001 = 100)
Notes:The Retail Price Index (RPI) (cigarettes) measure used here is the Office for National Statistics’ (ONS)’ ‘cigarettes and tobacco’ Retail
Prices measure (designation: CHBE).
Source: The most popular price category (MPPC) data are published by theTobacco Manufacturer’s Association (http://www.the-tma.org.uk/
tma-publications-research/facts-figures/uk-cigarette-prices/). The weighted average price measure is based on our own calculations. RPI and
weighted average price data are taken from November each year while the MPPC data are taken from January of the following year because
the MPPC on 1 January each year is based on price data from the end of the previous year (Frank van Driessche, European Commission, 2010,
personal communication), and this, therefore, provides the best comparison. Hence, the year categories have been labelled ‘2001–02’,
‘2002–03’, etc. in this graph. Consequently, however, changes to the value added tax (VAT) regime from December 2008 onwards have an
effect on the MPPC figures before this effec appears in the RPI and weighted average price (WAP) figures. (Having consistently been 17.5%,
VAT reduced to 15% in December 2008, returned to 17.5% in January 2010 and increased to 20% in January 2011.)
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particularly among price-sensitive poorer and younger
smokers [5,44] and evidence that price increases are the
best intervention to reduce inequalities in smoking [7],
this article has important implications for policy.
Despite its documented involvement in cigarette
smuggling [45–50], the tobacco industry consistently
argues that tax and price increases lead to smuggling
[6,51].Yet, we show that, even in the UK, where taxes are
among the highest in Europe and globally [52–54], the
industry is overshifting taxes, in direct contradiction to its
lobbying stance. This suggests the industry is not opposed
to price increases per se, but wants this to occur via its own
price increases and not via tax increases to ensure that its
profits and not government revenues increase. This rep-
resents a missed opportunity for governments and high-
lights the extent to which industry is mis-using the
smuggling argument.
The need to narrow the price differential between
expensive and cheap cigarettes, and to prevent TTCs from
price discounting the cheapest brands is also highlighted.
A number of interventions would be effective in this
regard. Minimum pricing is one option, but contravenes
EU competition rules [6] and could serve to further
increase TTC profits, already considerably higher than
most consumer staple companies [34]. Instead, the latest
EU Directive [9] allows a minimum excise tax and we
suggest this be set at the highest possible level. Second,
maximising the specific element of tobacco excise would
narrow the price gap, with specific taxes found to be rela-
tively more effective in increasing prices and reducing
cigarette consumption than ad valorem taxes [55].
Unfortunately, however, the EU continues to require an
ad valorem element [9] and, according to our data,
despite the UK having some of the highest levels of spe-
cific tax among EUmember states [52], in 2009 only 51%
of the total tax burden (including VAT) on premium and
58% on ULP brands was specific (our own calculation).
Given evidence of a growth in price-based cigarette
marketing [56,57] with at least one campaign selling
ULP brands at a loss [58], we suggest that such efforts be
combined with a prohibition on below-cost selling and
price-based marketing. As the latter sometimes takes the
form of price-marked packs [57], this would be facilitated
by plain packaging legislation. In the interim, marketing
expenditure data (similar to that required by the US Food
and Drug Administration) [6] is needed to enable track-
ing of the industry’s use of price-based promotions.
Another option would be to consider price cap regula-
tion [34] in which a cap is placed on the pre-tax cigarette
manufacturers’ price (and thus on the profit the tobacco
companies can make), but not on the retail price that
consumers face (i.e. prices will remain high for consum-
ers to deter use). Well established in the utilities industry,
price cap regulation would set a maximum price that
cigarette companies can charge for their product. Such a
system would have the added benefits of addressing the
problem of market failure and excess profits in the
tobacco industry [34], and of increasing government
revenue by transferring the excess profits from the indus-
try to the government purse. It could also help control
other unwanted industry practices, such as cigarette
smuggling, price-fixing and marketing to the young.
Using weighted average cigarette prices will give more
accurate assessment of price trends than RPI or MPPC.
The shift from basing tobacco excise rates on theMPPC to
the weighted average retail selling price in the latest EU
Directive [9] is therefore to be welcomed. However, it is
also essential to monitor trends by price segment. Obtain-
ing such data can be prohibitively expensive. Govern-
ments should therefore require industry to provide
brand- and category-specific price data on a timely basis
and, in turn, make such data available to researchers so
that tobacco prices can be more closely monitored.
Finally, we note that this research was prompted by
one of our observations of rising industry profits com-
bined with the growing market share of cheap cigarettes,
highlighting the important role that research on corpo-
rations, including monitoring of corporate practices, can
play in developing effective public health policy.
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